Cerebral coherence between communicators marks the emergence of meaning by Stolk, Arjen et al.
Cerebral coherence between communicators marks
the emergence of meaning
Arjen Stolka,1,2, Matthijs L. Noordzijb,1, Lennart Verhagena,c, Inge Volmana,d, Jan-Mathijs Schoffelena,e,
Robert Oostenvelda, Peter Hagoorta,e, and Ivan Tonia
aDonders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Radboud University, 6500 HB Nijmegen, The Netherlands; bDepartment of Cognitive Psychology and
Ergonomics, University of Twente, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands; cDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, OX1 3UD Oxford,
United Kingdom; dBehavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands; and eMax Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics,
6500 AH Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Edited by Asif A. Ghazanfar, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and accepted by the Editorial Board October 31, 2014 (received for review August 4, 2014)
How can we understand each other during communicative inter-
actions? An influential suggestion holds that communicators are
primed by each other’s behaviors, with associative mechanisms au-
tomatically coordinating the production of communicative signals
and the comprehension of their meanings. An alternative sugges-
tion posits that mutual understanding requires shared conceptuali-
zations of a signal’s use, i.e., “conceptual pacts” that are abstracted
away from specific experiences. Both accounts predict coherent neu-
ral dynamics across communicators, aligned either to the occurrence
of a signal or to the dynamics of conceptual pacts. Using coherence
spectral-density analysis of cerebral activity simultaneously mea-
sured in pairs of communicators, this study shows that establishing
mutual understanding of novel signals synchronizes cerebral dy-
namics across communicators’ right temporal lobes. This interper-
sonal cerebral coherence occurred only within pairs with a shared
communicative history, and at temporal scales independent from
signals’ occurrences. These findings favor the notion that meaning
emerges from shared conceptualizations of a signal’s use.
social interaction | theory of mind | experimental semiotics |
dual functional magnetic resonance imaging | conceptual knowledge
Human sociality is built on the capacity for mutual un-derstanding, but its principles and mechanisms remain poorly
understood (1). Given the pervasive ambiguity of communicative
signals (2), how can we expect to understand each other? For
instance, I might think of tacitly asking my friend Tom to enter
a pub by virtue of a pointing gesture toward a nearby bike, be-
lieving that both of us recognized the bike of his girlfriend Emma,
only to realize how my gesture would be interpreted differently as
Tom tells me about his recent split from Emma (2, 3).
An influential suggestion holds that communicators are mutually
primed by each other’s behaviors, with associative mechanisms
automatically coordinating the production of communicative signals
and the comprehension of their meanings (4–8). In this framework,
mutual understanding arises by virtue of individual experiences with
a signal’s properties, as when linguistic features of a word are biased
by recent experience of those features (9, 10). Alternatively, mutual
understanding might require shared conceptualizations of a signal’s
use, abstracted away from specific experiences during a communi-
cative interaction (11–14). In this framework, mutual understanding
arises from what communicators mutually know, “conceptual pacts”
that are negotiated by communicators over the course of their
interactions (11). Although both possibilities emphasize that
communicative signals are context dependent (15), they put dif-
ferent emphasis on the relevance of the communicative signal.
Both possibilities predict that mutual understanding is neurally
implemented through temporally coherent and spatially over-
lapping activity across communicators (7, 16–18), but with differ-
ent cerebral dynamics. If meaning is shared by virtue of signals’
features, then communicators’ cerebral coherence should be syn-
chronized to the occurrence of those signals (7, 19, 20). If meaning
is shared through conceptual pacts, then communicators’ cerebral
coherence should be synchronized to abstractions generalized over
multiple communicative episodes, without reference to the
occurrence of a specific experience (1, 11, 14). Those predictions
can be tested by manipulating the dynamics of mutual un-
derstanding across communicators, while capturing the dynamics
of their interpersonal cerebral coherence.
Mutual understanding was manipulated with an experimen-
tally controlled communicative task (16, 21). This task precludes
the use of communication channels and preexisting shared rep-
resentations used during daily communication (e.g., a common
idiom, body emblems, facial expressions), thereby gaining con-
trol over the communicative environment and the history of
that environment (16, 21). The cerebral characteristics of mu-
tual understanding were isolated through three nested analyses
performed on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
activities simultaneously recorded in pairs of communicators
engaged in understanding each other over a series of commu-
nicative interactions (22, 23). First, a model-based analysis iso-
lated cerebral signals whose temporal profile matched the
behavioral dynamics of mutual understanding observed across
Communicators and Addressees. Second, a model-free analysis
determined the frequency and phase characteristics of the in-
terpersonal cerebral coherence of Communicator–Addressee
pairs. Third, a model-based analysis tested whether interpersonal
cerebral coherence in Communicator–Addressee pairs is spe-
cifically driven by the creation of novel shared meanings, in-
dependently from responses to transient signals.
Significance
Building on recent electrophysiological evidence showing that
novel communicative behavior relies on computations that
operate over temporal scales independent from transient sen-
sorimotor behavior, here we report that those computations
occur simultaneously in pairs with a shared communicative his-
tory, but not in pairs without a shared history. This pair-specific
interpersonal synchronization was driven by communicative
episodes in which communicators needed to mutually adjust
their conceptualizations of a signal’s use. That interpersonal ce-
rebral synchronization was absent when communicators used
stereotyped signals. These findings indicate that establishing
mutual understanding is implemented through simultaneous in-
phase coordination of cerebral activity across communicators,
consistent with the notion that pair members temporally syn-
chronize their conceptualizations of a signal’s use.
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Results
Twenty-seven pairs of participants were asked to jointly create
a goal configuration of two geometrical tokens, using the
movements of the tokens on a digital game board as the only
available communicative signal. One member of a pair, the
“Communicator,” knew the goal configuration, and he moved his
token on the game board with his right hand to inform the other
member, the “Addressee,” where and how to position her token
(Fig. 1A, Movie S1, and Fig. S1). A systematic analysis of the
communicative signals used by each pair of participants indicates
that Communicators and Addressees do not independently learn
overlapping interpretations of the behaviors. Rather, Commu-
nicators take into account how Addressees interpreted their
signals, and adjust them accordingly (see SI Materials and
Methods and Fig. S2 on how pairs converge on a shared mean-
ing). Furthermore, the same sequence of movements (a signal)
could be used by different pairs to represent different meanings,
and the same meaning could be conveyed by different signals
across different pairs (e.g., Movies S1–S4). The same signal could
even be used to convey different goal states in different inter-
actions within the same pair (16). These observations indicate
that, in this task, despite the asymmetric load on signal pro-
duction, signal–meaning mappings are dynamically and jointly
constructed by each communicative pair of Communicators and
Addressees from a vast space of possibilities (16, 21, 24). Despite
the obvious surface differences between this communicative task
and daily conversations, in both situations effective communica-
tion arises only when a pair converges on a shared meaning (1, 12).
We experimentally manipulated the dynamics of shared meaning
by using two types of communicative problems distributed over 84
successive interactions. There were problems in which the pairs
converged on stereotyped signal–meaning mappings in a train-
ing session before the fMRI experiment (“Known” inter-
actions), and there were problems in which signal–meaning
mappings were open for negotiation (“Novel” interactions).
Accordingly, during novel interactions, the same pair could solve
multiple instances of the same problem type through different
communicative behaviors, depending on the recent history of
interactions of that pair (Movies S5–S7), an indication of the
ability of this game to capture the dynamics of pair-specific
conceptual pacts (11).
Matched Brain–Behavior Dynamics of Mutual Understanding. First,
we searched across the whole brain for a cerebral dynamics
matching the behavioral dynamics of mutual understanding.
Over time, Communicator–Addressee pairs logarithmically in-
creased their communicative success when dealing with Novel
problems [F(1,40) = 51.6; P < 0.001; R
2
adj = 0.55], against a stable
and fully successful performance during Known problems (Fig.
1B). During Known trials, performance can largely rely on re-
trieval of mutual knowledge preestablished for each problem.
Multiple regression analysis revealed that the medial prefrontal
cortex and the right temporal lobe were more involved during
Known interactions than Novel interactions (Fig. S3), two cor-
tical regions previously shown to be more involved during com-
municative than noncommunicative control interactions (16).
Within the right temporal lobe, an anterior portion of the su-
perior temporal gyrus [right superior temporal gyrus (rSTG)]
showed a cerebral dynamics that matched the behavioral dy-
namics of mutual understanding, namely the same logarithmic
increase as communicative success over the course of Novel
problems (Fig. 1C). This region had the peculiarity that, despite
large differences in the sensory inputs and motor outputs experi-
enced by Communicators and Addressees, its temporal dynamics
was closely matched across both members of a communicative pair
(Fig. 1C). This finding opens the possibility to isolate the in-
terpersonal coupling mechanisms that drive those increases in
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal across Communi-
cators and Addressees, with both increases matched to the dy-
namics of mutual understanding.
Interpersonal Cerebral Coherence During Mutual Understanding.
Second, we defined the characteristics of interpersonal cerebral
coupling of Communicator–Addressee pairs. We reasoned that
mutual understanding should be particularly evident in real
communicative pairs that were in the process of creating shared
meanings. In contrast, mutual understanding cannot emerge in
random pairs engaged in solving the same communicative
problems as real pairs, but without a shared communicative
ground. Cerebral correlates of mutual understanding that ful-
filled this criterion were characterized with coherence spectral-
density analysis of BOLD time series from the rSTG of pairs of
participants. This analysis provides model-free estimates of in-
terpersonal coherence, namely frequency and phase-lag of ce-
rebral dynamics of Communicators and Addressees. There was
interpersonal coherence in the rSTG dynamics at 0.01–0.04 Hz
(25–100 s), only within real communicative pairs, with zero
phase-lag [0.05 ± 0.23 π (mean ± SD); Fig. 2C and Fig. S5]. This
data-driven finding is particularly relevant for distinguishing
between the two possible mechanisms of mutual understanding
because coherence was present at a frequency well below the
∼0.05-Hz periodic occurrence of individual communicative
problems and behaviors (every ∼20 s; vertical dashed line in Fig.
2C). For comparison, a control region (around the left central
sulcus; Fig. 2F), expected a priori to show interpersonal couplings
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Fig. 1. Behavioral and cerebral markers of mutual understanding. (A)
Communicative interaction: to achieve a joint goal configuration of their
tokens (top left grid), the Communicator needed to convince the Addressee
to move her token (in orange) to a location and orientation unknown to her.
The Communicator could achieve this only by moving his token (in blue)
across the digital grid, knowing that the Addressee will observe and in-
terpret those movements as best as she can, before moving her token in
response (see Fig. S1A and Movie S1 for full sequence of events). Successful
performance requires each pair to share the meanings of those communi-
cative signals. (B) There were communicative problems for which the pairs
had previously established mutual understanding (Known, with communi-
cative success at ceiling level), and problems in which shared meaning of the
communicative signals had yet to be established (Novel, with logarithmically
increasing success). Scan time is binned in seven blocks of six communicative
problems each. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. (C) A whole-brain model-based
analysis (P < 0.05, familywise error corrected) indicated that activity in the
right superior temporal gyrus (rSTG) ([58, −8, 5]) was higher during Known
than Novel interactions and followed the same logarithmically increasing
dynamics as communicative success during Novel interactions, both in
Communicators producing communicative signals and in Addressees com-
prehending those signals (see Figs. S3 and S4, and Table S1 for masking
procedures). For anatomical reference, the location of Heschl’s gyrus is in-
dicated in red. The two lower panels indicate parameter estimates of activity
evoked in rSTG over scan time as a function of problem type (Known, Novel),
separately for Communicators and Addressees. Continuous lines indicate
a significant fit to a logarithmic function.
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driven by the sensorimotor events occurring in the experiment,
was coherent across real pairs at a frequency of 0.05 Hz (20 s)
with a phase-lag corresponding to 7 s (0.7 ± 0.11 π; Fig. 2H and
Fig. S5). These parameters closely match the dominant experi-
mental frequency and the average temporal gap between the
token movements of the participants in a pair (Fig. S1A). In-
spection of the BOLD time series revealed that this region,
unlike rSTG, remained indifferent to the Known or Novel nature
of the communicative problems (compare Fig. 2 D and I), de-
spite a strong sensitivity to the trial-by-trial timing differences
between real and random pairs. Given that communicative
problems and behaviors were also designed to be out of phase
(Fig. 1A), the zero phase-lag low-frequency cerebral coherence
found in the rSTG indicates that mutual understanding cannot
emerge from mutual priming linking production and compre-
hension of individual communicative behaviors (5, 6, 25). Rather,
zero phase-lag low-frequency cerebral coherence limited to those
pairs with a shared communicative history indicates that mutual
understanding relies on pair-specific computations decoupled
from the occurrence of specific communicative events within
communicating pairs.
State-Specific Cerebral Synchronization During Mutual Understanding.
Third, we tested whether the interpersonal cerebral coherence
found in real pairs is specifically driven by the creation of novel
shared meanings. Following previous behavioral findings (16, 21),
we expected that mutual understanding should be particularly
evident when real communicative pairs create shared meanings,
i.e., during Novel trials, and less when the same pairs retrieve
stereotyped signal–meaning mappings, i.e., during Known trials.
Behaviorally, real pairs had stronger interaction-by-interaction
couplings than random pairs during Novel interactions [cross-
correlation of planning times; real pairs: r = 0.15 ± 0.18, mean ±
SD; random pairs: r = 0.06 ± 0.16; t(727) = 2.8; P = 0.006, two-sided
independent t test], whereas no differential mutual adjustments
were observed over the course of the Known interactions (real
pairs: r = 0.09 ± 0.17; random pairs: r = 0.06 ± 0.17). The cerebral
sources of this stronger interpersonal coupling in real pairs during
Novel trials were isolated with a cross-correlation analysis on in-
dependent fMRI time series for each set of Known and Novel
problems, i.e., communicative episodes with dynamics corre-
sponding to the frequency characteristics of interpersonal cou-
pling. Furthermore, to test whether this interpersonal coupling
was independent from responses to transient events within each
trial, a multiple regression analysis estimated subject-specific
time series of rSTG activity. This model-based analysis generated
independent fMRI time series for each task state, defined as one
or more consecutive communicative problems of the same type
(Novel, Known), having accounted for and removed variance
related to transient task events within the occurrence of each
communicative problem (Fig. S1A). Differential cross-correla-
tion effects between Novel and Known task states were esti-
mated on both real and random pairs. This analysis isolates
a cerebral index of mutual understanding with a clear behavioral
correlate, having controlled for noncommunicative shared
experiences across real pairs, e.g., the effects of being engaged in
the same task in the scanner, systematic differences in task dif-
ficulty between Known and Novel problems, shared experimental
structure, and task duration. There was stronger cross-correlation
between rSTG activities evoked during episodes involving Novel
than Known problems, but only in real pairs [F(1,1454) = 4.6, P =
0.032; Fig. 2E]. This interaction was driven by stronger cross-
correlation of the Novel than the Known task states, t(26) = 3.3,
P = 0.003 (two-sided paired t test), and by stronger real than
random pair cross-correlation of the Novel task states, t(727) =
2.0, P = 0.044 (two-sided independent t test).
These results lead to two observations. First, pair-specific co-
herence consisted in simultaneous changes occurring when
interlocutors needed to mutually adjust their conceptualizations
of a signal’s use (Novel task states), but not when interlocutors
were using stereotyped signal–meaning mappings (Known task
states). Second, pair-specific coherence in the rSTG was driven
by coupled activity related to whole communicative episodes,
rather than to specific task events within each individual com-
municative problem. These two observations provide empirical
evidence for the notion that mutual understanding pertains to
N N N N N N N N
K K K K K K KK
0
0.06
0.12
0.18 Real pairs
Random pairs
0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2
Frequency (Hz)
Left sensorimotor cortices (control)
In
te
rp
er
so
na
l c
oh
er
en
ce
A
Φ = 0 
Φ = -0.45 
(~ -2.2s)
Φ = 0.7 
(~ 7s)
P
ow
er
 (a
.u
.)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.20
0.01
0.02
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Frequency (Hz)
Frequency (Hz)
Communicators
Addressees
Right superior temporal gyri
C
B Real pairs
Random pairs
Real pairs
Random pairs
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.01
0.02
Frequency (Hz)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Interpersonal powerspectrum correlation
*
F
H
G Real pairs
Random pairs
Communicators
Addressees
0 100 200 300
−2
0
2
0 100 200 300
−2
0
2
Time (s)
B
O
LD
 s
ig
na
l (
a.
u.
)
Time (s)
D I
Interpersonal powerspectrum correlation
N N N N N N N N
K K K K K K KK
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
In
te
rp
er
so
na
l s
ta
te
 c
or
re
la
tio
n
NK NK
NK NK
E J*
Real pairs Random pairs
Real pairs Random pairs
2
Fig. 2. Pair- and state-specific cerebral synchronization during mutual un-
derstanding. (A) Power spectral densities of BOLD signal in rSTG reveal
predominantly low-frequency effects in both Communicators and Addres-
sees. Shades indicate ±1 SEM. (B) Power spectra of real and random com-
municative pairs were matched, ruling out power differences as a source of
pair-specific phase coupling. Error bars indicate ±1 SD. (C) Coherence spectra
of real communicative pairs differed from those of random pairs at fre-
quencies lower than the dominant experimental frequency (indicated by
dashed line, ∼0.05 Hz). Gray surface indicates frequencies with a statistically
significant difference in coherence (P < 0.05, corrected for multiple com-
parisons across frequencies, nonparametric randomization across participant
pairs). Coherence values are magnitude squared to indicate explained vari-
ance per frequency bin. (D) Representative BOLD signal time courses of
a real communicative pair (bandpass filtered between 0.01 and 0.04 Hz).
Dashed lines indicate onsets and offsets of communicative interactions.
K and N denote Known and Novel problem types, respectively. (E) Pair-
specific (real vs. random pairs) and state-specific (Novel vs. Known episodes)
synchronization of rSTG activity, estimated independently for each group of
communicative problems. Synchronization was stronger in real pairs dealing
with Novel problem types. (F) Power spectral densities of BOLD signal in left
sensorimotor cortex ([−38, −19, 55]) reveal consistent activation at the
dominant experimental frequency. (G) Power spectra of real communicative
pairs were more similar than those of random pairs. Asterisk denotes P <
0.001. (H) Coherence spectra of real communicative pairs differed from those
of random pairs at the dominant experimental frequency, with a phase
difference matching the average temporal gap between the movements of
the participants in a pair. Gray surface indicates frequencies with a statistically
significant difference in coherence. Dark gray bars at Bottom indicate fre-
quencies with a statistically significant phase difference. (I) BOLD signal time
courses of the same communicative pair as in D (bandpass filtered between
0.03 and 0.07 Hz) from the left sensorimotor cortex. (J) BOLD signal synchro-
nization of left sensorimotor cortex was not influenced by pair or state.
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a mutually known conceptual structure that gives meaning to
individual communicative signals (11, 12).
Interpretational Issues. It could be argued that the cerebral dy-
namics and interpersonal couplings quantified in this study re-
flect the dynamics of the task structure, rather than mutual
understanding. In fact, several task features and control analyses
qualify the specificity of these findings. The first analysis isolated
common dynamics across Communicators and Addressees, ex-
cluding the contribution of sensorimotor or cognitive factors
limited to only one member of a communicative pair. The second
analysis indicates that the increase in coherence among real
communicative pairs occurred in the context of matched ampli-
tude and distribution of spectral power in Communicators and
Addressees (Fig. 2 A and B). This finding ensures that the in-
creased coherence was due to pair-specific phase coupling.
Furthermore, the zero phase-lag low-frequency cerebral co-
herence could not be a consequence of task-driven sensorimotor
events, like eye movements, given that communicative problems
and behaviors were designed to be out of phase (Fig. 1A). Shared
knowledge of the task structure, e.g., whether the current prob-
lem is Known or Novel, cannot be driving the interpersonal co-
herence, given that only the Communicator had access to that
knowledge. The third analysis indicates that interpersonal co-
herence in the rSTG followed the behavioral profile of in-
terpersonal couplings in planning times, while being independent
from transient task events. This finding excludes that low-fre-
quency interpersonal coherence reflects any shared experiences
of the two communicators that is happening across more than
one interaction. Furthermore, a number of control analyses ex-
clude that the findings are a consequence of pair-specific co-
herent changes in attention to auditory stimulation of the MR
scanners (Fig. S6), changes in visual attention (Fig. S7), changes
in the state of the default-mode network as task difficulty de-
creased (Fig. S8), or shared trial-specific features (Fig. S9). Fi-
nally, the pair-specific and state-specific cerebral synchronization
observed in rSTG was anatomically specific, being clearly absent
from regions previously suggested to be involved in social action
understanding and in theory of mind computations (Fig. S10).
Discussion
This study shows that establishing mutual understanding relies on
cerebral activity that is spatially and temporally coherent across
communicators. This cerebral activity followed the dynamics of
mutual understanding over the course of the experiment and
emerged from a region embedded in a circuit previously shown to
be relevant for human communication (16). The interpersonal
coherence of this cerebral activity followed temporal scales in-
dependent from transient sensorimotor behavior, and it occurred
simultaneously, only in pairs with a shared communicative history.
Furthermore, pair-specific temporal synchronization of this ac-
tivity occurred when novel communicative knowledge was gener-
ated among pairs with a shared communicative history, but not
when those communicators could rely on stereotyped signal–
meaning mappings that did not require equally frequent updating.
Taken together, these findings indicate that establishing mutual
understanding is implemented through matched cerebral dynam-
ics across communicators, independently from responses to tran-
sient signals.
These observations discriminate between two current accounts
of how humans can understand each other. This study indicates
that interpersonal cerebral coherence related to the emergence
of mutual understanding was decoupled from the occurrence of
specific communicative events within communicating pairs. This
observation provides an empirical argument against the hy-
pothesis that mutual understanding arises by virtue of individual
experiences with a signal’s properties (5, 6), and more generally
against models of human referential communication that em-
phasize signal transmission (7, 19). In fact, this study indicates that
communicators’ interpersonal cerebral coherence operates across
multiple communicative episodes, supporting the hypothesis that
mutual understanding arises from shared conceptualizations of
a signal’s use (11, 12). The anatomical findings of this study
reinforce that conclusion. Interpersonal cerebral coherence
emerged from a site, the rSTG, necessary for interpreting visual
motion events as driven by mental states (26, 27), and distinct
from posterior temporal sites involved in processing biological
motion (28, 29). A neighboring portion of the rSTG (<12-mm
distance) has also been shown to interpret pragmatic features of
linguistic events, embedding utterances into their conversational
context (30). Taken together, those reports and the current study
converge in linking the rSTG to processing conceptual knowl-
edge attributed to other human agents, dynamically adjusting
that knowledge to the current situation. In contrast, anatomical
sites previously suggested to support human referential com-
munication [e.g., “action-observation network” (31, 32), “per-
spective-taking network” (33), and the “social brain” (34)]
showed interpersonal coherence effects that were not influenced
by the emergence of mutual understanding (Fig. S10). Those
sites lacked the pair-specific and state-specific response profile
observed in the rSTG.
Building on previous studies focused on communicative
behaviors during live social interactions (16, 18, 22, 23, 35–38),
this study has experimentally manipulated the dynamics of mu-
tual understanding to assess its consequences on interpersonal
cerebral coherence. It remains to be seen which neural mecha-
nism can support the extremely long integration window (∼100 s)
through which the rSTG contributes to mutual understanding.
Tonic up-regulation of broadband neural activity, previously
shown to integrate driving afferences with contextual in-
formation (16, 39), may support the integration of the current
communicative signal within the conceptual space defined by the
recent history of communicative interactions. It also remains to
be seen whether the present findings generalize to communica-
tive situations involving faster turn-taking and multiple com-
munication channels, e.g., the situation faced by interlocutors in
daily conversations. Faster and more complex signals might
modulate the cerebral circuits supporting our ability to develop
meaning from shared conceptualizations of a signal’s use (40,
41). However, it remains unclear whether faster and more
complex signals, per se, can resolve the fundamental computa-
tional bottleneck of the multiple ambiguities of those signals (1–3,
42). This bottleneck becomes obvious in a number of situations
requiring access to mutual understanding without preexisting
shared meanings, e.g., communicative interactions with artificial
agents (43). The findings of this study suggest that those agents
might better satisfy human communicative expectations by using
a cognitive architecture that embeds communicative signals into
a conceptual space continuously updated by shared communi-
cative history, over and above rapid searches from a large array
of preestablished associations (7).
Materials and Methods
Participants. Fifty-four right-handed male participants (assigned to 27 com-
municative pairs, 18–27 y of age) were recruited to take part in this study.
They were screened for a history of psychiatric and neurological problems
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants gave written
informed consent according to institutional guidelines of the local ethics
committee (Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects, region Arnhem-
Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and were either offered a financial payment
or given credits toward completing a course requirement.
Task. The task was organized in a series of trials, each constituting a single
communicative interaction. At interaction onset, each player is assigned
a token (epoch 1: token assignment, Fig. S1A). Then the Communicator (and
the Communicator only) is shown the goal configuration of that interaction
(epoch 2: planning). The goal configuration contains the tokens of the
Communicator (in blue) and the Addressee (in orange), at the grid locations
and orientations they should have at the end of the interaction. Both
interlocutors know that the Addressee does not see the goal configuration,
and that the Communicator cannot move the Addressee’s token. Therefore,
the Communicator needs to communicate to the Addressee the location and
orientation that her token should have at the end of the interaction. To
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comply with the task requirements, the Communicator also needs to ensure
that at the end of his turn his token is at the location and orientation
specified by the goal configuration. In this game, the only means available
to the Communicator for communicating with the Addressee is by moving
his own token around the grid, namely horizontal translations, vertical
translations, or clockwise and counterclockwise rotations. Both Communi-
cator and Addressee also know that the Communicator has unlimited time
available for planning his moves, but only 5 s for moving his token on the
grid. The Communicator signals his readiness to move by pressing the start/
stop button. At this point, the goal configuration disappears, the Commu-
nicator’s token appears in the center of the grid, and he can start moving his
token (epoch 3: movement). After 5 s, or earlier if the Communicator hits the
start/stop button again, the Communicator’s token cannot move further and
the Addressee’s token appears alongside of the game board. This event
indicates that the Addressee has acquired control over her token. The Ad-
dressee has unlimited time to infer the goal location and orientation of her
token on the basis of the observed movements of the Communicator (epoch
4: planning). After the Addressee presses the start/stop button, her token
appears at a random location on the game board (excluding goal positions
of the Communicator’s and Addressees’ tokens) and she has 5 s to move her
token (epoch 5: movement). Finally, after 5 s, or earlier if the Addressee hits
the start/stop button again, the same feedback is presented to both players
in the form of a green tick or red cross (positive or negative feedback, re-
spectively; epoch 6: feedback). The feedback indicates whether the partic-
ipants had matched the location and orientation of their tokens with those
of the goal configuration.
The Addressee cannot solve the communicative task by reproducing the
movements of the Communicator’s token. Rather, the Addressee needs to
disambiguate communicative and instrumental components of the Com-
municator’s movements, and find a relationship between the Communica-
tor’s movements and their meaning. There are no a priori correct solutions
to the communicative task, or a limited set of options from which the
Communicator could choose. The behaviors and neural activity evoked by
this communication game are described in detail in SI Materials and Meth-
ods and in previous publications (16, 17, 21, 24, 44–47).
Experimental Design. An experiment comprised three parts; two training
sessions outside the scanners, followed by one fMRI session in which func-
tional brain images were acquired on both participants of a pair, simulta-
neously. In the first training session, the participants were individually trained
with using a hand-held controller. Afterward, both members of a commu-
nicative pair were jointly familiarized with the general procedures and events
of the interactive task (10 interactions with no communicative demands). In
the second training session, each communicative pair was jointly familiarized
with the communicative aspect of the task and their communicative roles,
which were fixed across the experiment. In fact, unbeknownst to the par-
ticipants themselves, within this session the participants were driven to es-
tablish mutual understanding on a set of communicative problems. The
training session was completed only when the participants had successfully
solved at least 25 communicative problems, without communicative failures
in any of their last 10 problems.
The fMRI session consisted of 84 communicative interactions. One-half of
these interactions consisted of problem types previously faced by the par-
ticipant pair within the training session, now labeled as Known interactions.
One-half of the interactions were Novel interactions, i.e., problem types that
were not presented to the pair before. The participant pairs were not in-
formed about the nature of the interactions. Known and Novel interactions
were pseudorandomly intermixed, with a maximum of three interactions of
the same condition in a row. Known and Novel interactions used different
combinations of token shapes and orientations, and different goal config-
urations. During Known interactions, the Communicator–Addressee token
pairs were chosen from triangle–rectangle, rectangle–circle, triangle–circle,
and triangle*–circle pairs (with the label “triangle*” indicating a triangle
pointing outwards the game board). During Novel interactions, the Com-
municator–Addressee token pairs were chosen from rectangle–triangle,
circle–rectangle, circle–triangle (e.g., Fig. 1A), and circle–triangle*. During
Novel interactions, the Communicator’s token could be moved through
fewer orientations than the Addressee’s token. For instance, when the
Communicator’s token was a circle and the Addressee’s token was a triangle,
then the Communicator needed to find a way to indicate to the Addressee
the orientation of her token, because rotations of the circle token were not
visible. A further level of difficulty could be introduced by using a triangle*
as the Addressee’s goal configuration, the Communicator’s token being
a circle. During Novel interactions, when a pair jointly solved four problems
with the same type of goal configuration, consecutively, it was assumed that
the pair had established a consistent way to solve that communicative
problem. Accordingly, that goal configuration was substituted with a new
goal configuration for the remainder of the experiment. The rationale of
this intervention was to drive participants to continuously create new com-
municative behaviors, rather than exploiting already established communica-
tive conventions.
fMRI Image Acquisition and Analysis. Functional magnetic resonance images
of a Communicator and Addressee pair were acquired simultaneously in
separateMRI scanners. Communicators were scanned using a 3-T Trio scanner
(Siemens). BOLD-sensitive functional images were acquired using a single
shot gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence [repetition time (TR)/echo
time (TE), 2.60 s/40 ms; 34 transversal slices; interleaved acquisition; voxel
size, 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm3]. Structural images were acquired using a magne-
tization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MP-RAGE) sequence (TR/TE, 2.30 s/3.9
ms; voxel size, 1 × 1 × 1 mm3). Addressees were scanned using a 1.5-T Sonata
scanner (Siemens) and a single-shot gradient EPI sequence (TR/TE, 2.70 s/40 ms;
34 transversal slices; ascending acquisition; voxel size, 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm3).
Structural images were acquired using a MP-RAGE sequence (TR/TE, 2.25 s/3.68
ms; voxel size, 1 × 1 × 1 mm3).
The images were preprocessed and statistically analyzed using FSL (FMRIB
Software Library; fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/) and SPM8 (Statistical Parametric
Mapping; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Preprocessing of the functional scans
included brain extraction (48), spatial realignment (rigid-body transformations
using sinc interpolation algorithm), slice-time correction, coregistration [of
functional and anatomical images, after prior coregistration of both image
types to a Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template], reslicing (1.5 × 1.5 ×
1.5 mm), spatial nonlinear normalization [to MNI space (49)], and spatial
smoothing (isotropic 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel). Each anatomical image
was segmented into three different tissue compartments (gray matter,
white matter, cerebral spinal fluid). Mean signals in the latter two com-
partments and head movement-related parameters (including derivatives of
translations and rotations to the mean as obtained during the spatial re-
alignment) were entered as regressors in all first-level fMRI analyses. During
model estimation, the data were high-pass filtered (cutoff, 128 s), and tem-
poral autocorrelation was modeled as an autoregressive (1) process.
The seven epochs shown in Fig. S1A were considered for the first-level
fMRI analyses of both Communicators and Addressees. The feedback event
(epoch 6, Fig. S1A) was modeled separately for positive and negative out-
comes of an interaction. Task epochs pertaining to Communicators planning
their moves, and Addressees observing the Communicators’ moves were
modeled separately for Known and Novel interactions, with durations set to
the trial-specific epoch durations. Each epoch time series was convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function and used as a regressor in the
SPM general linear model. In addition, the emergence of meaning over the
course of the experiment in the Novel interactions was modeled as a para-
metric (logarithmic) modulation of BOLD signal over scanning time during
planning (for Communicators) and observation epochs (for Addressees). This
choice was grounded on the logarithmic modulation of communicative
success observed in the pairs’ behavior during Novel interactions (green
curve in Fig. S1D). For visualization purposes of these time-modulatory
effects (Fig. 1C), we considered planning and observation regressors that
each encompassed six consecutive interactions (labeled as a “scan time bin”;
Fig. 1) rather than one, i.e., to obtain more reliably estimated data points of
cerebral activation during those epochs over the course of the Known and
Novel interactions.
Interpersonal coherence analysis was performed using the FieldTrip
toolbox for magnetoencephalography/electroencephalography analysis
(fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/) (50) and custom MATLAB code (MathWorks). Whole-
experiment BOLD signal time series were extracted from regions of interest,
synchronized to experiment onset, bandpass filtered (0.0025- to 0.02-Hz
frequency domain brick-wall filter), and nuisance-corrected using mean
signals of white matter and cerebral spinal fluid compartments and head
movement-related parameters. The BOLD signal time series of Addressees
were resampled to match the sample frequency of Communicators using
linear interpolation (TR of 2.70 s compared with 2.60 s). For each participant,
the time series was segmented into multiple consecutive overlapping win-
dows of 400 s (75% overlap). The windows were then tapered with a set of
three orthogonal Slepian tapers before spectral estimation and calculation
of the magnitude squared coherence. This resulted in a spectral smoothing
of ±0.005 Hz.
Interpersonal state correlation analysis was performed using cross-corre-
lation of subject-specific time series of cerebral activity estimated in-
dependently for each task state. These independent fMRI time series
(composed of regressor weights) were obtained using multiple linear
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regression, modeling the BOLD signal of each participant’s task state
separately for Known and Novel problem types (26 task states per
problem type), with each task state including one or more consecutive
communicative problems. We additionally considered eight different task
epochs (the seven epochs indicated in Fig. S1A, with feedback epochs
modeled separately for outcome) to account for variance related to
transient task events within each task state.
Statistical Inference at the Group Level. To test for the consequences of ex-
perimentally manipulating mutual understanding on cerebral activity, we
performed a group-level whole-brain search of BOLD signal that had an
equivalent temporal profile as communicative success over the course of the
experiment (Fig. 1C). This search involved localizing cerebral activity that was
higher during Known than Novel interactions (Fig. S3) and followed a loga-
rithmic increase during Novel interactions (Fig. S4), both in Communicators
producing communicative signals and Addressees comprehending those
signals. We also estimated the change in cerebral activity over the course of
Known interactions to control for unspecific changes in BOLD signal over
time (see Table S1 for masking procedures). These contrasts were entered
into a full factorial model with Role (Communicator, Addressee) as between-
subjects variable, and Problem type (Known, Novel) and Time (No modula-
tion, Parametric modulation) as within-subjects variable, treating subjects as
a random variable. Unequal variance between the conditions was assumed,
and the degrees of freedom were corrected for nonsphericity at each voxel.
We report the results of a random-effects analysis, with inferences drawn at
the cluster level, corrected for multiple comparisons over the whole brain
using Random Fields Theory based familywise error correction [P < 0.05 (51)].
Clusters were obtained on the basis of a cluster-generating threshold (u) of P <
0.05. We play on the strength of conjunction analyses to isolate neural effects
overlapping between the two roles, Communicators and Addressees (52).
Pair specificity of BOLD signal synchronization was tested by comparing
interpersonal cerebral coherence calculated on BOLD signals of participants
forming real pairs (Nreal pairs = 27) with cerebral coherence calculated on BOLD
signals of participants that did not share a communicative history (e.g., Com-
municator from pair 1 with Addressee from pair 2; Nrandom pairs = 702; i.e., 27 ×
26 combinations). The coherence measures were entered into a second-level
random-effects analysis correcting for multiple comparisons at the cluster level
[Monte Carlo P < 0.05; 10,000 randomizations across participant pairs (53)].
Pair and state specificity of BOLD signal synchronization was tested by com-
paring cross-correlations of Known and Novel task state time series estimated
on both real and random pairs using a 2 × 2 univariate ANOVA.
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